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Classifying Systems of Constitutional Review: A Context-Specific Analysis
SAMANTHA LALISAN*
“Access to the court is perhaps the most important ingredient in judicial power,
because a party seeking to utilize judicial review as political insurance will only be
able to do so if it can bring a case to court.”1
INTRODUCTION
Europe’s experience with democratically elected fascist regimes leading to World War II
is perhaps one of the most important developments for the establishment of new constitutional
democracies. Post-war constitutional drafters sought to establish fundamental constitutional rights
and to protect those rights through specialized constitutional courts.2 Many of these new
democracies entrenched first-, second-, and third-generation rights into the constitution and
included provisions to allow individuals access, direct or indirect, to the constitutional court to
protect their rights through adjudication. In the wave of constitutionalism in post-war Europe,
constitutional courts were “seen as protecting democracy.”3
One of the attractions of specialized constitutional courts,4 as opposed to the American
model of constitutional review in which any court can decide questions of constitutionality,5 is the
implied elevation and importance of the constitution. That is, by creating a special body that

* Samantha Lalisan, Juris Doctor, 2019, Indiana University Maurer School of Law; Bachelor of Arts, 2016, UCLA.
1
ANDREW HARDING, PETER LEYLAND, & TANIA GROPPI, CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS: FORMS, FUNCTIONS AND
PRACTICE IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE IN CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 20 (Andrew
Harding & Peter Leyland eds., 2009).
2
Enrique Guillén López, Judicial Review in Spain: The Constitutional Court, 41 LOY. L. REV. 529, 530 (2008)
(“These countries simultaneously reintroduced constitutional democracy . . . [t]he constitutional courts in these
concentrated-control systems are considered fundamental to the political stability of their respective constitutions
because they were, to a large extent, responsible for the social acceptance of these texts.”).
3
TOM GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES: CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN ASIAN CASES 2 (2003).
4
Constitutional courts are specialized courts with “authority to adjudicate questions of constitutional interpretation
or to review legislation” and that are separate from the judiciary. John Ferejohn & Pasquale Pasquino, Constitutional
Adjudication: Lessons from Europe, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1671, 1672 (2004); ALEC STONE SWEET, CONSTITUTIONAL
COURTS, OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 (2012). The founding intellectual ancestor
of constitutional courts is Hans Kelsen, the first Chief Justice and designer of the Austrian Constitutional Court. Id.
5
Constitutional Courts emerged more than a century after the American model of constitutional review was
established. See Lech Garlicki, Constitutional Courts Versus Supreme Courts, 5 INT’L J. CON. L. 44 (2007).
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adjudicates questions of constitutionality, the constitution is seen as distinct and important.
However, if the constitutional review occurs at all levels, there is a risk of “dragging the prestige
of the constitution down to the level of the adjudicators in the public eye.”6
Interestingly, developments in Latin American constitutional adjudication have brought
the constitution down to the level of the adjudicators while maintaining the courts’ prestige.7 Latin
American countries have largely adopted constitutional courts, but with their own twist. The region
is a mosaic. Almost all countries in the region have adopted, not only the European constitutional
court model, but have also incorporated aspects of the American model in their judiciary.8 For
instance, although constitutional courts are largely considered a centralized model of constitutional
review, several Latin American countries have adopted the centralized model with aspects of the
decentralized model and, accordingly, allow ordinary courts to hear cases on constitutional
questions. Furthermore, the prestige of the constitution and that of constitutional courts has,
arguably, been upheld as citizens have increasingly used provisions that permit direct access to the
constitutional court to protect their fundamental rights.9
The mixture of the American and European models of constitutional review has
undoubtedly created difficulties when trying to categorize the countries into types of constitutional
review.10 The traditional mode of classification relies substantially on the European model of

6

Id. at 10.
See generally Justin O. Frosini & Lucio Pegoraro, Constitutional Courts in Latin America: A Testing Ground for
New Parameters of Classification, 3 J. COMP. L. 39 (2008).
8
See generally Donald L. Horowitz, Constitutional Courts: A Primer for Decision Makers, 17 J. DEMOCRACY 125,
128 (“There is no single, incontrovertibly best way to structure a constitutional court. Constitutional courts vary
among themselves.”).
9
For example, the Colombian Constitutional Court issued 1,340 tutela action decisions in 2000. Colombian
Constitutional Court, Statistics 1992–2018, http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/estadisticas.php.
10
See Frosini & Pegoraro, supra note 7, at 39 (“Attempting to classify the constitutional adjudication systems in
Latin America is by no means an easy task given the ‘creativity’ that has been used in developing them. Very rich
and diverse approaches have been taken and one would commit a gross generalization if one were to talk of a ‘Latin
American model of constitutional justice.’”).
7
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constitutional review as the starting point and, thereby, does not accurately capture constitutional
review in Latin American countries. A quick survey of “classified” Latin American countries tends
to produce the limited and pervasive category of “mixed.”11 Indeed, the traditional classification
parameters understandably focus on jurisdictional dichotomies as the salient point of comparison
as European constitutional courts are most easily distinguished in this manner, but grossly overgeneralize for the purposes of Latin American constitutional court classification.12
Modern constitutional drafters and advisors increasingly use judicial review classifications
and the current model for classification does not accurately capture constitutional review in Latin
America. This paper proposes context-specific classification that can accurately capture
constitutional review in the Latin American region. Specifically, this paper argues that the contextspecific analysis suggests that the more salient point of classification in Latin America is that of
access mechanisms to constitutional courts. As such, the paper proceeds in four parts: Part I
examines the traditional model of classification in Europe and focuses on the Spanish and German
direct access mechanisms. Part II explores the mosaic Latin America with a particular focus on the
Colombian, Brazilian, and Mexican direct access mechanisms. Part III argues that a contextspecific analysis that starts categorizing judicial review with Latin America draws out access to
constitutional courts and objects of review as the most salient point for classification. The Part also
considers how European countries would be classified in light of the Latin American
classifications. Finally, Part IV contemplates lessons for future classification in light of the
importance of context-specific analyses.

11

See, e.g., European Commission for Democracy Through Law, Study on Individual Access to Constitutional
Justice, CDL-AD (2010) 039 rev., at 7 (2011) [hereinafter Venice Commission].
12
Cf. Miguel Schor, An Essay on the Emergence of Constitutional Courts: The Cases of Mexico and Colombia, 16
IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 173, 175–76 (2009) (“More attention needs to be paid to the role of courts in the
troubled or partial democracies that are the norm in much of the developing world, including Latin America. It is in
new democracies, after all, that scholars can observe the birth of institutions such as constitutional courts.”).
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I.

THE TRADITIONAL CLASSIFICATORY LENS

Difference in jurisdiction is the conventional dichotomy that has been used to classify
constitutional adjudication. The main distinction in jurisdiction is whether the country has a
“centralized” or “decentralized” system of adjudication. The United States is typically identified
as the primary example of “decentralized” review because the United States Supreme Court does
not have exclusive jurisdiction over cases regarding constitutional questions. Instead, all American
courts may hear cases that involve constitutional questions, and the Supreme Court can hear
appeals of those cases. In contrast, a centralized system for constitutional review means that only
a specialized court may hear cases regarding constitutional questions.13 Indeed, the founding
intellectual ancestor of constitutional courts, Hans Kelsen, stated that constitutional courts are
specialized courts with “authority to adjudicate questions of constitutional interpretation or to
review legislation” and that are separate from the judiciary system.14
The focus on jurisdiction to classify constitutional courts in European countries has been
largely successful.15 After the establishment of the Austrian Constitutional Court in 1920, several
countries copied it and by the 1970s nearly all Central and Eastern European countries had
established a constitutional court.16 Interestingly, these constitutional courts were established
following a period of authoritarian rule because the existing courts were perceived as “unable to

13

It should also be noted that whether a country has a centralized or decentralized system is also related to whether
the country has a common or civil law system. Civil law systems tend to have a centralized system of review and
thus constitutional courts. See Garlicki, supra note 5, at 44.
14
Harding, Leyland, Groppi, Constitutional Courts: Forms, Functions and Practice in Comparative Perspective 4, in
Constitutional Courts: A Comparative Study (Andrew Harding & Peter Leyland, eds. 2009); ANDREW HARDING,
CONSTITUTION BRIEF: THE FUNDAMENTALS OF CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS, INSTITUTE FOR DEMOCRACY AND
ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE 1 (2017). For example, the Spanish Constitution even lists the Constitutional Court
separately from ordinary judicial functions. See Spanish Const. Parts VI and IX.
15
Constitutional scholars have argued that some European countries should be considered “hybrid” rather than
centralized. For example, it is argued that Italy is a “hybrid” system because it does not conform to the Kelsenian
model for constitutional review as ordinary judges may petition the Constitutional Court. See Frosini and Pegora,
supra note 7, at 42.
16
See Venice Commission, supra note 11, at 12.
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offer adequate guarantees of structural independence and intellectual assertiveness.” 17 Globally,
since 1980, 66 systems have adopted some form of judicial review and 47 specifically adopted a
centralized model of review.18 The following examines access and jurisdiction in the Spanish and
German constitutional courts.
A. Spanish Constitutional Review
The Spanish Constitutional Court played a central role in the country’s period of transition
(La Transición) to democracy following the end of the Franco dictatorship (1939).19 Indeed, the
framers of the Constitution created the Court to be the “supreme interpreter of the Constitution”
with jurisdiction over the entire country.20
The Constitution mandates that the Constitutional Court guarantee the supremacy of the
Constitution through its judicial processes, namely: appeals challenging the constitutionality of
legislation and questions of constitutionality referred by ordinary courts. Specifically, the Court
has jurisdiction over conflicts of jurisdiction between self-governing communities and the state,21
appeals regarding provisions adopted by self-governing communities,22 and, importantly,
individual appeals for protection (recurso de amparo).23
Amparo is one of the main powers accorded to the Constitutional Court. It allows
individuals to seek protection of their constitutional rights against violations by legislation,

17

Garlicki, supra note 5, at 45.
Tom Ginsburg, Economic Analysis and the Design of Constitutional Court, 3 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 49, 57
(2002).
19
Violeta Ruiz Almendral, Brief on the Remedy for the Protection of Individual Rights before the Spanish
Constitutional Court (recurse de amparo), VENICE COMMISSION 3 (May 13, 2015),
https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-JU(2015)009-e.
20
Organic Law 2/1979 on the Constitutional Court, art. 1; see also Spanish Const. art. 161; Lopez, supra note 2, at
540.
21
Spanish Const. art 161(1)(c).
22
Id. art 161(2).
23
Id. art 161(1)(b).
18
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omissions, actions by public officials, and judicial decisions by lodging a complaint with the
Court.24 The scope of the procedural protection is quite broad:
The appeal for constitutional protection shall be available in accordance with the
provisions of this Law, against violations and freedoms referred to in the previous
paragraph resulting from provisions, legal enactments, omissions or flagrantly
illegal actions (via de hecho) by public authorities of the State, the Autonomous
Communities and other territorial, corporate or institutional public bodies, as well
as by their officials or agents.25
The right to file an appeal for protection with the Constitutional Court requires that the
individual seeking protection first exhaust all judicial remedies available because the ordinary
courts are considered the “first guarantors in the legal system.”26 In practice, the Constitutional
Court is a “special court of appeals”27 when non-constitutional and ordinary legal means could not
repair the violated fundamental rights.28 For example, if an administrative decision is challenged,
the petitioner must exhaust all ordinary legal means through the predetermined administrative
channels before filing an amparo action before the Constitutional Court.29 In addition, the petition
must provide “notification or certificate of the [lower court] decision that terminated the judicial
or administrative proceedings.”30 Furthermore, the appellate function of the Constitutional Court
has complicated its independent relationship from ordinary judicial functions. Specifically, the

24

Id. art. 162. There are three types of amparo: appeals against parliamentary decisions, against governmental and
agency decisions, and against judicial decisions. Constitutional Court of Spain, Amparo (Appeal for Constitutional
Protection of Fundamental Rights), https://www.tribunalconstitucional.es/en/tribunal/ComposicionOrganizacion/competencias/Paginas/04-Recurso-de-amparo.aspx; Tribunal Constitutcional at 4
http://www.tribunalconstitucional.es/en/jurisprudencia/InformacionRelevante/Folleto-divulgativo-EN.PDF.
25
Organic Law 2/1979 on the Constitutional Court, art. 41.2
26
Tribunal Constitucional de Espana, 26 Cuestiones Basicas sobre el Recurso de Amparo Constitucional 9 (2018);
see also Almendral, supra note 19, at 5.
27
Victor Ferreres Comella, The Spanish Constitutional Court: Time for Reforms, 3 J. COMP. L. 22, 29 (2008);
Constitutional Court of Spain, Amparo, https://www.tribunalconstitucional.es/en/tribunal/ComposicionOrganizacion/competencias/Paginas/04-Recurso-de-amparo.aspx.
28
See Tribunal Constitucional de Espana, 26 Cuestiones Basicas sobre el Recurso de Amparo Constitucional 9
(2018).
29
Organic Law 2/1979 on the Constitutional Court, art. 43; Tribunal Constitucional, Conferencia de Tribunales
Constitucionales Europeos: Ponencias Españolas 418 (2007),
https://www.tribunalconstitucional.es/en/publicaciones/Publicaciones/Coedicion-TCEuropeos.pdf.
30
Organic Law 2/1979 on the Constitutional Court, art. 49(2).
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Court may only question whether there was an infringement of a fundamental right in the case,
rather than whether the ordinary court correctly decided the case on a factual and legal basis. These
murky lines between what the ordinary court decides and what the Constitutional Court may
consider have been cause for confusion.31
In addition to the exhaustion requirement and considering the dangers of overburdening
the Court,32 petitioners must demonstrate the “special constitutional relevance” (especial
transcendencia constitucional) of his or her claim.33 That is, the violation of a constitutional right
is not enough to justify an amparo appeal before the Constitutional Court, the appeal must also
have a special significance. The Court determines the appeals’ significance with regard to “its
relevance for the interpretation and application of the Constitution, or for the effectiveness thereof,
and for determining the content of scope of fundamental rights.”34
B. German Constitutional Review
Modeled after the Austrian Constitutional Court in the 1920s, the German Constitutional
Court was the first established specialized constitutional court in postwar Europe and was meant
to be the most important judicial instrument that would uphold the superiority of the new German
Constitution, the Basic Law.35 Following the Austrian model, the German Court exercises
centralized review which means that it is the only body that interprets the Basic Law.36 While its

Comella, supra note 27, at 30. However, “from a procedural perspective, it has never been possible to provide for
a truly genuine separation of jurisdictions; in almost all countries that decided to establish a separate constitutional
court, this court’s powers eventually intervened in some areas traditionally controlled” by other courts. Garlicki,
supra note 5, at 47.
32
See TRIBUNAL CONSTITUCIONAL, CONFERENCIA DE TRIBUNALES CONSTITUCIONALES EUROPEOS: PONENCIAS
ESPAÑOLAS 418 (2007), https://www.tribunalconstitucional.es/en/publicaciones/Publicaciones/CoedicionTCEuropeos.pdf.
33
Organic Law 2/1979 on the Constitutional Court, art. 50.
34
Organic Law 2/1979 on the Constitutional Court, art. 50.
35
Garlicki, supra note 5, at 50.
36
German Const. art. 93(1)(1).
31
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predecessor under the Weimar Republic, the Staatsgerichtshof, was only granted jurisdiction to
resolve federal disputes, the new Constitutional Court was given broad competence to hear
disputes between the Lander and the federal government, cases regarding the constitutionality of
legislation, disputes between federal organs, and individual constitutional complaints.37
The Basic Law did not include a constitutionally guaranteed right of direct access to the
Constitutional Court (via the constitutional complaint or verfassungsbeschwerde) until 1968 as a
constitutional amendment.38 Now, this form of complaint is likely the most popular access
mechanism in the Court as over 6,000 constitutional complaints are filed every year.39 In fact, over
95% of the Court’s proceedings are hearings on constitutional complaints. Any natural or legal
person may lodge a constitutional complaint in the Constitutional Court “stating that their
fundamental rights or certain rights that are equivalent to fundamental rights have been violated
by German public authority.”40 Indeed, the complaint is meant to be “an extraordinary remedy
open to the citizen with which he [or she] may challenge public interference in his basic
constitutional rights.”41 In practice, however, the requirements leading up to the filing of the
complaint undermine the notion of an extraordinary remedy.

37

Stefan Oeter, Federal Republic of Germany, in A GLOBAL DIALOGUE ON FEDERALISM: LEGISLATIVE, EXECUTIVE,
AND JUDICIAL GOVERNANCE IN FEDERAL COUNTRIES 149 (Katy LeRoy & Cheryl Saunders eds., 2006).
38

Before the constitutional amendment, the German government passed the Federal Constitutional Court Act of
1951 to allow for constitutional complaints. WERNER HEUN, CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEMS OF THE WORLD: THE
CONSTITUTION OF GERMANY 173 (2011).
39
See Constitutional Complaint, The Federal Constitutional Court,
https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/EN/Verfahren/WichtigeVerfahrensarten/Verfassungsbeschwerde/verfassungsbeschwerde_node.html.
40
Constitutional Complaint, The Federal Constitutional Court,
https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/EN/Verfahren/WichtigeVerfahrensarten/Verfassungsbeschwerde/verfassungsbeschwerde_node.html. “Public authority” has been interpreted
to mean direct and indirect state authority by legislative, executive, and judicial powers. See ALFRED RINKEN, THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL COURT AND THE GERMAN POLITICAL SYSTEM IN CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN
COMPARISON: THE U.S. SUPREME COURT AND THE GERMAN FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL COURT (Ralf Rogowski &
Thomas Gawron eds., 2002).
41
Rinken, supra note 40, at 66.
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The Court has actively applied procedural requirements to permit flexibility in granting
and restricting access. Although anyone may file a constitutional complaint against a public
authority, the act of public authority must have had some legal effect that led to a legal violation
of the complainant’s fundamental rights. For instance, a constitutional complaint filed against a
foreign policy decision that has no domestic legal effect on the complainant does not satisfy this
requirement.42 The constitutional complaint must also affect the complainant “individually,
presently and directly with regard to his or her fundamental rights.”43 Lastly, the constitutional
complaint is only admissible before the Court once all other legal remedies are exhausted.44
Importantly, this exhaustion requirement highlights the relationship, and potential tension,
between the ordinary courts and the Constitutional Court. To satisfy the exhaustion requirement,
the petitioner must seek non-constitutional legal avenues in the ordinary courts and appeal
unfavorable rulings within the ordinary courts.45 In other words, the ordinary courts do not hear
the constitutional issues in a case and are limited to interpret non-constitutional law. However, if
there is an underlying fundamental rights question in a case before the ordinary court, the court
must take the rights issue into account.46 In practice, the petitioner must raise all motions in the
proceedings before the ordinary courts. For example, if the petitioner does not raise an objection
on the taking of evidence before the ordinary courts, she cannot raise this issue in her constitutional

42

HEUN, supra note 37, at 174.
Constitutional Complaint, The Federal Constitutional Court,
https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/EN/Verfahren/WichtigeVerfahrensarten/Verfassungsbeschwerde/verfassungsbeschwerde_node.html; see also, Gianluca Gentili, A
Comparative Perspective on Direct Access to Constitutional and Supreme Courts in Africa, Asia, Europe and Latin
America, 29 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 719–20 (2011).
44
German Const. art. 94(2); HEUN, supra note 37, at 175; Rinken, supra note 40, at 67. For example, in a 2012 case,
the Court found that the applicant did not fulfill the exhaustion requirement because she did not seek recourse in
lower courts. GER-2017-2-012 available at:
http://www.codices.coe.int/NXT/gateway.dll?f=templates&fn=default.htm.
45
OLIVER KLEIN, FCC RELATION TO GERMAN ORDINARY COURTS 2; Federal Constitutional Court Act § 90(2),
http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bverfgg/__90.html.
46
See KLEIN, supra note 45, at 4 (using the example of a person’s right to life and physical integrity).
43
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complaint.47 Furthermore, the petitioner must appeal her case all the way to the federal courts,
which are considered the “supreme ordinary courts.”48
If a constitutional complaint is subsequently filed with the Constitutional Court, the Court
may only review constitutional questions, not the federal courts’ interpretation or application of
non-constitutional law. Indeed, the Court is limited to reviewing only whether the review in the
ordinary courts’ ruling follows the Constitution.49 Consequently, if the Court finds that the Basic
Law was violated, it may reverse the ordinary court decision, void a law, and remand the case to
the competent ordinary court.50 Lastly, not all complaints are admitted to the Court for decision.
If the complaint is found to be of general constitutional significance, or it appears necessary to
avoid a grave disadvantage, then it will be admitted for decision.51
The requirements for filing a recurso de amparo in Spain and verfassungsbeschwerde in
Germany are arguably to ensure that the courts can adequately fulfill their judicial functions
without being overburdened52 and to filter out frivolous complaints. This is of course an important
mechanism as other democracies have largely struggled to ensure timely adjudication and a
functioning judiciary.53 The German and Spanish constitutional courts are similar in jurisdiction
(centralized) review and access (constitutional complaint), and that jurisdiction classification

47

Id.
Id. at 2–3.
49
Id. at 4.
50
Federal Constitutional Court, Constitutional Complaint,
https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/EN/Verfahren/WichtigeVerfahrensarten/Verfassungsbeschwerde/verfassungsbeschwerde_node.html.
51
Federal Constitutional Court Act § 90(2).
52
Rinken, supra note 40, at 68 (“Ironically, the main problem with the [German] constitutional complaint procedure
lies in its success! . . . The sheer number of constitutional complaints submitted has added to the [Constitutional]
Court’s notorious workload – to the point at which its ability to fulfill its judicial function was threatened.”); see
also Alec Stone Sweet, Constitutional Courts and Parliamentary Democracy (Special Issue on Delegation), Faculty
Scholarship Series, Paper 84, 87 (stating that the full constitutional complaint appeals in Spain and Germany
“comprise, by far, the largest class of complaints”).
53
See, e.g., India Supreme Court Judges: Democracy is in Danger, BBC NEWS (Jan. 12, 2018),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-42660391.
48
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suffices to adequately categorize several European countries.54 However, jurisdiction alone is
insufficient to categorize Latin America.
II.

THE MOSAIC LATIN AMERICA

If the traditional dichotomy of classifying constitutional review based on jurisdiction were
used in Latin America, then all countries in that region would be classified as “hybrid” as they all,
to some degree or another, have no clear pure decentralized or centralized system.55 Indeed, the
diversity in constitutional review in the region is not adequately captured by the traditional
dichotomy. The following section examines jurisdiction and access in Colombia, Brazil, and
Mexico to demonstrate the inadequacy of using jurisdiction, rather than access, to categorize Latin
American countries and suggests that access is a better method for classification to classify
European and Latin American countries.
A. Brazilian Constitutional Review
Heavily inspired by the American model of judicial review, the 1891 Republican Constitution
first established a decentralized system of review with a Supreme Court, rather than a
constitutional court.56 Interestingly, the American influence on Brazilian judicial review was
evident even when the country was under a monarchy. In 1889, the last Brazilian Emperor, Dom
Pedro II said:
Carefully study the organization of the Supreme Court of Justice of Washington. It
seems to me that the secret of the good functioning of the North American
Constitution lies in the functions of its Supreme Court . . . and I believe that if we
could create a tribunal like the North American one and confer to it the attributions
of the moderator power of our Constitution, the latter would benefit.57
54

Most European countries have centralized systems. (refer to Venice Commission list and list out all EU countries
for impact).
55
Frosini & Pegora, supra note 7, at 42.
56
Conrado Hubner Mendes, Judicial Review of Constitutional Amendments in the Brazilian Supreme Court, 17 FLA.
J. INT’L L. 449, 444–45 (2005).
57
Maria Angela Jardim de Santa Cruz Oliveira, Reforming the Brazilian Supreme Federal Court: A Comparative
Approach, 5 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 99, 104 (2006).
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However, by 1965, aspects of centralized review were adopted, and judicial review became
more “mixed,” rather than strictly decentralized.58 Specifically, the Writ of Representation, which
granted the Attorney General exclusive standing in the Supreme Court to challenge the
constitutionality of legislation abstractly, began the centralization of review in Brazil.59 The Writ
was later expanded to include additional actors that could directly petition the Court.60
The main function of the Court is to “guard and interpret the Constitution”61 and thereby decide
matters regarding questions of constitutionality. The mixed nature of judicial review has resulted
in a wide range of procedural paths by which citizens and legal and political entities can raise
questions of constitutionality of the acts of public authority.62 For example, true to the centralized
aspects of the system, the Court engages in abstract review through four types of procedures: the
challenge of breach of fundamental precept, direct challenge of unconstitutionality, declaratory
action of constitutionality, and direct challenge of unconstitutionality by omission.63 These access
mechanisms may generally only be used by public officials and are typical of the model of
centralized review that Kelsen advocated.64
Importantly, the diffuse aspects of Brazilian judicial review are most clearly demonstrated in
the access mechanisms that are constitutionally granted to individual citizens: habeas corpus,
mandado de segurança (writ of security), habeas data, mandado de injunção, ação popular and
See Justice José Antonio Dias Toffoli, The Evolving Role of Brazil’s Supreme Court, BRAZIL INSTITUTE (2016),
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/bi_rule_of_law-toffoli_finalv2.pdf.
59
Abstract review means that the case is not tied to a particular set of case facts and there is no actual conflict. Santa
Cruz Oliveira, supra note 57, at 106; Mendes, supra note 56, at 455.
60
Santa Cruz Oliveira, supra note 57, at 107.
61
For a discussion on the Supremo Tribunal Federal’s role as a rights protector, see Diana Kapiszewski, Power
Broker, Policy Maker, or Rights Protector? The Brazilian Supremo Tribunal Federal in Transition in COURTS IN
LATIN AMERICA (Gretchen Helmke & Julio Ríos-Figueroa eds., 2011).
62
Toffoli, supra note 58, at 3.
63
Brazilian Federal Supreme Court, About the Court: Judicial Review,
http://www2.stf.jus.br/portalStfInternacional/cms/verConteudo.php?sigla=portalStfSobreCorte_en_us&idConteudo=
120199.
64
See Toffoli, supra note 58, at 3.
58
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ação civil publica.65 The mandado de segurança, perhaps the most expansive access mechanism,
is a form of direct access and decentralized review as it may be filed before ordinary courts and
the Supreme Court for constitutional review. The writ is meant to protect rights that are “liquid
and certain”66 and not protected under habeas corpus “when the party responsible for the illegality
or abuse of power is a public authority or a [government] agent.”67 The writ has preferential status
on the courts’ docket and the judge must make a decision within thirty days of filling.68 In practice,
the writ is used to obtain a preliminary injunction that will suspend the challenged act or procedure
until the case is decided.69 The Supreme Court hears, directly, petitions on writs of security that
challenge acts by the President, Executive Committees of the Chamber of Deputies and the Federal
Senate, the Tribunal of Accounts of the Union, Procurator-General, and the Supreme Court.70 The
Supreme Court also hears ordinary appeals of writs of security that were originally decided and
denied by the Superior Tribunals.71

65

Brazilian Federal Supreme Court, About the Court: Diffuse Constitutional Control,
http://www2.stf.jus.br/portalStfInternacional/cms/verConteudo.php?sigla=portalStfSobreCorte_en_us&idConteudo=
123036.
66
Brazilian Const. art 5(LXIX). The “liquid and certain” requirement means that “the petitioner’s right must be
manifestly clear on the basis of documents attached to the petition, unless a needed document is in the hands of the
respondent authority.” Rosenn, Procedural Protection of Constitutional Rights in Brazil, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 1009,
1024 (2011).
67
Constitução Federal art. 5(LXIX) (Braz.) (“Concederse-á mandado de segurança para proteger direito líquido e
certo, não amparado por habeas-corpus ou habeas-data, quando o responsável pela ilegalidade ou abuso de poder por
autoridade pública ou agente de pessoa jurídica no exercício de atribuições do poder publico”). (Trans: “A writ of
security (mandado d segurança) shall be issued to protect a liquid and certain right not protected by habeas corpus or
habeas data, when the party responsible for the illegality or abuse of power is a public authority or an agent of a
legal entity performing governmental duties” Notably, the mandado de segurança cannot be used against
individuals.”) See Allan R. Brewer-Carías, Leyes de Amparo de América Latina: Con un Estudio Preliminar sobre
El Amparo en el Derecho Constitucional Comparado Latinoamericano 57 (Editorial Jurídica Venezolana
International, 2016) (“el mandado de segurança solo se puede intentar contra el Estado y no contra personas
individuales, se considera que el estado mismo o sus dependencias no pueden intentar el recurso.”).
68
Keith S. Rosenn, Procedural Protection of Constitutional Rights in Brazil, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 1009, 1025 (2011).
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B. Colombian Judicial Review
Often called the “constitutional watch guard” and “guardian of constitutional rights,” the
Colombia Constitutional Court was created in 1991 when the country’s new Constitution was
ratified amid issues of rampant violence, an overly powerful president, and government failure to
protect individual rights.72 Unlike the gradual development of the Brazilian system from a purely
decentralized system to a mixed system, Colombia adopted a mixed system of review from the
very beginning.73 Specifically, the Colombian Constitution mixes a Constitutional Court, which is
typical in centralized systems, with a decentralized form of judicial review, the acción de tutela.
Acción de tutela is a preferential and summary procedure lodged by an individual seeking
immediate protection of her fundamental constitutional rights.74 The Constitution states that
“[e]very individual may claim legal protection before the judge, at any time or place” and the Court
must address the tutela action within ten days of the request.75 However, the action may only be
lodged “when the affected party does not have access to other means of judicial defense, except
when [it] is used as a temporary device to avoid irreversible harm.”76
Tutela actions are heard in three stages. The tutela first goes to an ordinary court with the
possibility for appeal to a higher-ranking judge within the same judiciary.77 The appellate and trial
court decisions are automatically sent to the Constitutional Court, which has discretion to select
the cases it wants to review (“a certiorari-like discretionary power”).78 The cases are selected by a
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rotating panel of two Constitutional Court judges and the selected cases are heard by panels of
three judges.79 It is important to note, however, that although the Constitutional Court may hear
tutela actions from lower courts, legislation passed in 1991 has ensured that the action not be used
as a substitute for an appeal by prohibiting its use to challenge judicial decisions.80 The Court has
interpreted this restriction to apply only when the individual can apply to other judicial procedures
for expedient protection of their constitutional rights.81
C. Mexican Judicial Review
The 1994 constitutional reforms led by then President Ernest Zedillo began the Mexico
Supreme Courts’ transformation into an institution that protects the supremacy of the Constitution.
Indeed, during much of the twentieth century, the Mexican Court functioned under the thumb of
“dictator-presidents” and was not, in any sense, an independent institution.82 The 1994 reforms,
like the Brazilian Supreme Court, mixed the European and American judicial review systems.83
Instead of a constitutional court with centralized review, the Mexican system includes both
centralized and diffuse review.
Generally, the Constitution assigns the Supreme Court competence to hear cases on issues
between federal organs and states, constitutionality of legislation, and constitutional complaints
lodged by individuals. The individual complaint, or juicio de amparo,84 are requests for protection
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from “[l]aws or acts issued by the authority, or omissions committed by the authority, which
infringe the fundamental rights recognized and protected by [the] Constitution.”85 There are direct
and indirect amparo actions. Indirect amparos begin in district court, with the option to appeal to
a higher court, and are brought against non-judicial government agents (i.e. police, public
administrators) to challenge, among other things, federal or local laws, international treaties,
regulations, and decrees.86 Direct amparos are initiated in the Collegiate Circuit Courts, but may
be brought directly to the Supreme Court, and challenge final judgments in lower, labor, and
administrative courts.87 There are five types of specific amparo actions: amparo as a defense of
individual rights, amparo against laws, amparo questioning the legality of judicial decisions,
administrative amparo, and amparo for agrarian matters.88
For the purposes of this paper, the amparo contra leyes, amparo against laws is most salient
as it involves individuals, rather than government entities, seeking constitutional review. It allows
the individual seeking protection to request the suspension of laws that violate his or her
fundamental rights, including “deprivation of life, personal liberty, deportations or banishment,
and extradition.”89 In order to lodge a complaint, the individual must show that the existence of
the law she is challenging violates individual guarantees and is materially prejudicial to her
interests, and the law must be in force at the time of the alleged injury. 90 The complaint is first
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lodged in federal district court with the option of appeals. Lastly, and importantly, the Court has
held that the individual filing an amparo against laws does not need to fulfill an exhaustion
requirement, which would require her to seek ordinary remedies, because the individual would
have to use the remedies afforded by the very law she is challenging on a constitutional basis.91
III.

A CONTEXT-SPECIFIC LENS

Latin American constitutional review presents a unique challenge when trying to classify
the diverse system. The confluence of American and European influence on Latin American
judicial review has made the region notoriously difficult to neatly classify.92 On the one hand, the
traditional classifications, as demonstrated through judicial review in Spain and Germany, are
generally necessary to provide standard classifications. However, the classification in the context
of Latin America makes the traditional use of jurisdiction too oversimplified. Indeed, if the above
examples of Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico were classified according to jurisdiction, each would
be listed as “mixed.” This oversimplification pushes against the attempt to avoid, on the other
hand, classifications that are too detailed.
Interestingly, the countries discussed in the previous Part seem to adopt contradictory
aspects of both the American and European models of constitutional adjudication that have worked
to produce some of the most active, rights protecting constitutional courts in the world.93 Given
the creativity in Latin America and the inadequacy of the traditional classification of jurisdiction,
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this paper argues that methods of access for constitutional review should be used to more
accurately distinguish review in Europe and Latin America. 94 However, a context-specific analysis
looking only at constitutional review in Latin American is also necessary to better categorize the
region and, specifically, this paper argues that the most comprehensive way to categorize the
region is by focusing on the Supreme or Constitutional Court’s objects of review.
As was demonstrated in the previous section, the use of jurisdiction to classify review is
too broad to adequately classify Latin American systems. While the German and Spanish
Constitutional Courts may be fairly classified as centralized,95 the Latin American countries
examined in this paper cannot. The Brazilian Supreme Court, Colombian Constitutional Court,
and Mexican Supreme Courts have all adopted aspects of both centralized and decentralized
review. Instead of adopting a constitutional court with strictly centralized review, as envisioned
by Kelsen, Brazil established a Supreme Court that performs the functions of a European
constitutional court by allowing only government and political entities to request abstract review
of legislation through various procedures while also permitting constitutional review in cases
lodged by individuals through the writ of security in the lower courts. In addition, although the
Colombian Constitutional Court was established with purely decentralized review, it gradually
adopted aspects of centralized review. Indeed, the very combination of a constitutional court with
the procedural protection of tutela actions itself demonstrates the mixed nature of the court.
Specifically, constitutional courts, such as the German example, are meant to exercise sole review
over constitutional matters and the tutela action by its nature permits constitutional review in the
See generally Frosini & Pegora, supra note 7, at 43 (“With the global spread of constitutional adjudication the
question is whether one should maintain the classic dichotomy . . . or whether other elements should be taken into
consideration in order to classify systems of constitutional review. With regard to Latin America we believe the
latter to be necessary.”).
95
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lower courts. The Mexican Supreme Court, and its unique and expansive use of amparo, resembles
the Brazilian Supreme Court’s mixed nature. That is, establishing a Supreme Court with
procedures (centralized review) that are typically allocated to constitutional courts while also
maintaining decentralized review. Given this diversity within Latin American judicial review, the
use of jurisdiction to classify the region (centralized v. decentralized review) is not a meaningful
point of comparison.
Instead, methods of access should be used to facilitate a better classification that captures
the European and Latin American models of constitutional review without resorting to the typical
“mixed” category. For example, a point of distinction to emphasize with regard to access is with
which court a petitioner may file a constitutional complaint. If she can only file the constitutional
complaint with the Supreme or Constitutional Court, then that country system is a closed system
of review. The Spanish and German Constitutional Courts are closed systems because the
petitioner can only have her constitutional questions addressed in the Constitutional Court.
Importantly, her general case may begin in ordinary courts because of exhaustion requirements in
which she must use all non-constitutional legal remedies available, but the constitutional questions
raised through amparo or verfassungsbeschwerde can only be heard the Constitutional Court.96
On the other hand, if the petitioner can file the constitutional complaint with any court, not only
the Supreme or Constitutional Court, then that country system is an open system of review. This
is typically the case in Latin America where the petitioner can file a mandado de segurança, tutela,
or amparo in ordinary courts and the Supreme or Constitutional Court.97 This dichotomy of
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whether a system of access is closed or open arguably expands on the traditional centralized or
decentralized dichotomy without resorting to a “mixed category.”
Although the access dichotomy facilitates better classification regarding differences
between the European and Latin American systems, it does not demonstrate the diversity within
Latin America itself. For example, there are generally three paths of access with a court: writ of
amparo (protection of fundamental rights and freedoms), writ of habeas corpus (personal freedom),
and writ of habeas data (freedom of information). All three are extraordinary judicial remedies that
are the hallmark of Latin American constitutional protection of human rights.98 Indeed, nearly all
Latin American countries have established the three judicial remedies99 and the only exceptions
are Chile, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, and Uruguay who have not adopted habeas data.100
Despite the well-placed emphasis on these access mechanisms in the region, categorizing Latin
American countries based on access mechanisms does not draw out any meaningful differences
because almost all of the countries in the region have adopted all of the access mechanisms.
A classification that focuses exclusively on Latin American constitutional review should
emphasize, not jurisdiction or access, but the Supreme or Constitutional Courts’ object of review.
Specifically, whether the Court can hear cases questioning the constitutionality of statute laws,
decrees, regulations, ordinances, charters of associations or trade unions, or international treaties.
Surprisingly, despite near uniformity in several countries on mechanisms of access, there is a lot
of diversity with regard to the types of cases the Court can hear. For example, the Brazilian,
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Colombian, and Mexican Supreme and Constitutional Courts may review the constitutionality of
statutes101 and international treaties.102 However, the countries differ regarding review of decrees,
regulations, ordinances, and charters of associations. Brazil permits the review of decrees 103 and
regulation,104 but not of ordinances and charters of association. The Colombian Constitutional
Court, however, permits review of decrees,105 but not of regulations, ordinances, or charters of
association. Lastly, the Mexican Supreme Court cannot hear cases questioning the constitutionality
of decrees, regulations, ordinances, or charters of association.106 Interestingly, none of these
countries permit review of ordinances or charters of associations.
Using the object of review method of classification to examine European countries
highlights interesting similarities and differences with the Latin American examples. First, the
German and Spanish Courts are similar to the Latin American country examples in that they can
review the constitutionality of statutes107 and international treaties.108 However, more expansive
than objects of review in Latin America, the German Court reviews charters of associations109 and
the Spanish Court reviews ordinances. 110 Notably, none of the Latin American countries examined
in this paper have the authority to review charters of associations or ordinances.
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The object of review method of classification, while more detailed than the traditional
jurisdiction or access dichotomy, shows differences between the European and Latin American
systems and differences within the latter that would otherwise have been overlooked. Indeed,
considering different methods of classification and moving away from the strict use of jurisdiction
by engaging in a context-specific classification of a region allows for more accurate categorization
that avoids the use of “mixed.”
IV.

LESSONS FOR FUTURE CLASSIFICATION AND CONSTITUTION-MAKING

The use of jurisdiction to classify judicial review in Europe has typically provided a
balance between using enough detail to draw out differences and using features that are broad
enough to encompass several different types. Mauro Cappelletti, one of the first scholars to classify
systems of judicial review into centralized or decentralized used the United States and Austrian
Constitutional Court as model examples, respectively. However, the jurisdiction dichotomy
becomes less sustainable as a feature for classification when several countries adopt systems that
mix aspects of a centralized and decentralized system,111 and when the feature does not facilitate
meaningful comparative knowledge. For this reason, this paper argues that context-specific
classifications that do not emphasize the feature of jurisdiction are necessary.
One important lesson that the context-specific analysis highlights, is the need to keep track
of changes within a particular region. In Latin America, the traditional dichotomy of jurisdiction
could have been a workable categorization when several countries were initially either centralized
or decentralized. For example, the Brazilian system was first strictly decentralized and later
adopted centralized features. However, the dichotomy is no longer a workable classification in
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Latin America because of the gradual mixing within the region. The jurisdiction dichotomy could
be workable in the European context as most countries have not mixed their systems of review to
the extent that Latin American countries have. It is for this reason though, that the use of
jurisdiction to compare across regions is difficult—it cannot take into consideration the
developments of constitutional review in Latin America.
In addition, assuming that the stated goal of any taxonomy or classificatory scheme is to
produce meaningful comparative knowledge, then the use of jurisdiction—and therefore noncontext-specific categorization—is not a fruitful enterprise. That is, jurisdiction does not highlight
salient differences and similarities between Latin American and European systems of
constitutional review or within Latin America itself. Instead, as was argued in earlier parts of this
paper, using the feature of access, whether open or closed, better distinguishes between the two
regions. The lesson to draw from this is the need to frequently question what classificatory feature
is best to highlight for particular regions. That is, whether to focus on features that are popular and
similar in several countries, or features that are draw out fundamental differences.
Lastly, as a result of similarities within a region, in this case uniformity regarding access
in Latin America, other features should be taken into consideration for constitutional review
classification. In other words, there should be flexibility regarding which features of classification
to emphasize. This paper argued that using the objects of review feature to classify Latin American
countries is a better point of comparison because it highlights differences that would otherwise
have been overlooked.
CONCLUSION
This paper has argued for context-specific classifications regarding constitutional review
in order to highlight the differences of jurisdiction, access, and objects of constitutional review in
23

the constitutional or supreme courts of Latin America and Europe. The argument could also be
applied more broadly to encompass any type of classification that does not accurately classify a
country system. However, it is important to consider that a context-specific analysis may not
always be best for comprehensively examining systems around the world. Indeed, comprehensive
comparative knowledge is increasingly needed as more countries experiences constitutional
reform moments. Nevertheless, classifications that take into consideration regional differences are
still important in order to accurately categorize a system.
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